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1. Introduction
Sociologists and social psychologists have been arguing for decades that group member-
ship is an important determinant of behaviour. Economists are late comers in this area of re-
search, but with the rise of experimental economics and renewed interest in other-regarding
preferences, several studies of group behaviour have been recently published in major jour-
nals, focusing in particular on the effect of group identity. “Group identity” is usually de-
fined as that part of an individual’s self-concept that is derived from the affiliation with a
social group. In terms that are familiar to economists, we may represent it as a set of beliefs,
preferences, norms, or decision heuristics that are dependent on group membership. Ex-
perimental and field data suggest that group identity is generally correlated with pro-social
attitudes towards the members of one’s group. Group identity for example makes us more
altruistic, egalitarian, trusting, trustworthy, and cooperative towards fellow members. In-
terestingly, it also inhibits punishment directed against free riders and norm violators. The
dark side of the picture is that group identity fosters negative attitudes towards the mem-
bers of other groups. It enhances competition, inequality, and the punishment of individuals
who do not belong to the same community.1
In spite of the wealth of evidence, there is little agreement on how these phenomena
should be explained theoretically. An approach that is currently popular among experi-
mental economists invites to model pro-social motives or attitudes as “social preferences”.
Models of social preferences incorporate concerns for the welfare, the actions, or the inten-
tions of other players by adding extra parameters in the arguments of utility functions.2 The
impact of group identity thus may be represented as a change in the values of pro-social
parameters, and estimated using standard econometric techniques (e.g. Chen and Li, 2009;
Benjamin et al., 2010; Bhatia, 2013).
The social preferences approach however is not the only game in town. According to an
alternative tradition (Tajfel, 1982; Bacharach, 2006), group identity is essentially a framing
1See e.g. Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010); Bacharach (2006); Benjamin et al. (2010); Bernhard et al. (2006);
Charness et al. (2007); Chen and Li (2009); Cooper and Kagel (2005); Eckel and Grossman (2005); Efferson et al.
(2008); Filippin and Guala (2013); Goette et al. (2010); Guala et al. (2013); Gu¨th et al. (2009); Hargreaves Heap
and Zizzo (2009); Ruffle and Sosis (2006); Sutter (2009); Sugden (2000); Zizzo (2011).
2There are more models of social preferences than can be mentioned here, but see Fehr and Schmidt (2006)
for a review of the literature.
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device. A “frame” is a body of information that subjects exploit to select a response in an
unfamiliar or complex decision environment. In the classic “Asian Disease” experiment of
Tversky and Kahneman (1986) for example, the way the options are presented (as “lives
lost” vs. “lives saved”) is strictly speaking irrelevant, but nonetheless triggers an automatic
emotional reaction that subjects rely upon when they make their decisions. In the case of
group identity, the collective frame may cue a set of heuristics that prescribe generosity and
cooperation with the members of one’s group.
Some theories combine elements of these two approaches: according to Akerlof and
Kranton (2000, 2010), for example, group identity is associated with a set of behavioural
rules or norms prescribing specific actions in specific circumstances. Their theory differs
from the heuristic account, however, because the effect of non-compliance with the norms
is included in the argument of people’s utility function.3 If group identity is a heuristic, in
contrast, it should not change the value of options, but rather induce the decision-maker to
use particular “fast and frugal” decision rules to economize effort (Gigerenzer et al., 2000).
The main difference between these two approaches concerns the regularity of the identity
effect. By adding extra parameters, of course, it is always possible to fit experimental data
into a utility function. Economists however seek models that combine simplicity with pre-
dictive power: the effect of identity on utility functions should be regular across decision
contexts. And if the framing interpretation is correct, we should expect social preference
parameters capturing group identity to be fragile to small contextual cues that trigger alter-
native heuristics.
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the regularity
of group identity in the context of distributive choice. Our study attempts to extend the
results of previous experiments that combine group identity manipulations with the use
of mini-dictator games. We move in two directions: first, we test the robustness of social
preference models across different distributive choices. To attain more generality we map a
broader range of options than previous experiments, by systematically varying the payoffs
of the decision-maker and the recipient in a series of games. Second, we test the regularity of
the group identity effect by slightly changing the frame of decision through the addition of
3For a similar attempt to model the influence of social norms, see Krupka and Weber (2013).
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dominated options. Previous studies indicate that enlarging the set of options may not only
increase the complexity of the decision task, but also change the framing of decision and
affect subjects’ choices among dominating options.4 Since robustness to different frames is a
basic requirement for any preference-based explanation, our experiment provides one way
to discriminate between social preference and heuristic accounts of group identity.
As we shall see, our data cast a shadow of doubt on social preference accounts. To begin
with, we do not find a systematic effect of group identity across the whole range of mini-
dictator games. The effect of group identity on distributive choice is modest and limited
to particular types of games. Then we show that the effect changes radically or disappears
when dominated options are added to the decision task. This suggests that group identity
is a heuristic tool that is highly dependent on contextual factors and that is easily displaced
when it competes for cognitive salience with alternative rules of thumb.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we illustrate the task that we use to
measure attitudes toward monetary allocations. Section 3 is devoted to experimental design
and procedures. The experimental results are illustrated and discussed in Section 4, while
Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2. Distributive choice and dictator games
In this paper we are concerned with the simplest kind of distributive choice, that is, the
allocation of resources among two individuals. In a standard dictator game, a subject (the
“dictator”) is given the opportunity to divide a sum of money between her own account
and the account of another subject, called the “recipient” (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe
et al., 1994). The recipient cannot accept or reject the offer: her role is entirely passive, and
as a consequence her payoff should be irrelevant for a perfectly rational dictator who only
cares about her own earnings. Nevertheless, a number of studies demonstrate that many
experimental subjects give a strictly positive amount to the recipient. This is usually inter-
preted as proof that other-regarding motives, social preferences, or social norms moderate
the basic selfish tendency to maximize one’s own payoffs (see e.g. Camerer, 2003).
4See e.g. Huber and Puto (1982), Simonson (1989).
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Dictator games can be used to study the effect of several factors on distributive choice,
including group identity. The study of group identity has its roots in the social psychology
literature of the 1960s (Sherif and Sherif, 1961; Tajfel et al., 1971). In most studies group iden-
tity is either imported in the laboratory as an exogenous variable – for example, when the
experimental subjects are already affiliated with two social groups – or is induced endoge-
nously in the laboratory by means of some “priming” procedure. In a typical experiment
subjects are first divided in groups on the basis of a salient category. They are then matched
with other subjects that belong either to the same group (ingroup condition) or to another
group (outgroup condition). Finally, they are asked to perform an economic task with real
or fictional payoffs. Any difference that may emerge between the group conditions and a
baseline condition without groups is attributed to group identity.
In a recent experiment Bhatia (2013) has used a “modified” dictator game to study the
effect of group identity on the price of giving. While in a standard dictator game every unit
of payoff that has been transferred to the recipient costs the dictator one unit, in a “modi-
fied” game the cost of giving can be lowered or raised at will. This procedure allows the
estimation of well-behaved preference relations in the space of self-other payoffs, satisfying
classic principles of consumer choice such as the Generalised Axioms of Revealed Preference
(Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
The use of “modified” dictator games however has some limitations. First of all, it is
meant to estimate well-behaved indifference curves, as it imposes a negative relative price
between payoffs (there is always a strictly positive cost that the dictator has to pay in order
to increase the payoff of the recipient). The method could in principle be extended to cover
budget constraints with non-negative slope, but at the cost of considerable complications in
the experimental instructions. Another concern is that investigating a non-negative price of
giving may be very expensive for the experimenter.
Such problems can be overcome using a variant known as the “mini-dictator game”,
as we do in this paper. In a mini-dictator game the decision-maker is required to choose
between a finite set of self/other allocations of monetary payoffs, such as:
Option A:(1000, 1000) Option B:(800, 1100) (1)
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The first figure within brackets is the payoff of the dictator, while the second figure cor-
responds to the payoff of the recipient. By forcing subjects to choose among two options it
is possible to map preferences over the broadest range of payoffs. Although classic dictator
games offer more options than mini-dictator games, the freedom allowed by the former goes
largely unexploited because choices tend to cluster around a few salient allocations.
In the above example, option A offers a perfectly equal allocation while B gives the op-
portunity to benefit the recipient at a cost for the dictator. It is very simple however to mod-
ify the payoffs to cover cases that cannot be easily studied using standard dictator games. In
the following games for example giving is inexpensive or even advantageous to the dictator:
Option A:(1000, 1000) Option B:(1000, 1100) (2)
Option A:(1000, 1000) Option B:(1100, 1200) (3)
So overall the mini-dictator task allows a better control over the opportunity set and
extends the scope of the dictator game. A third argument in favour of mini-dictator games
is that they are less sensitive to demand effects than standard or modified dictator games. It
is well known that observed allocations in the dictator game vary significantly depending on
whether the task is framed as a “giving” or “taking” decision (Bardsley, 2008; List, 2007). In
a mini-dictator game, in contrast, the presentation of the options is neutral and the demand
effect is diluted by the heterogeneity of the list of choices and by the randomization of the
order in which they are presented.
The number of allocations included in the set of options in each mini-dictator game can
be made to vary at will. In most experiments, subjects are offered only two options - a
simple design that we adopt in our Baseline and Ingroup conditions. Increasing the num-
ber of options however provides opportunities to test the robustness of group identity to
small changes in the decision environment. We do this by adding a couple of dominated
allocations in our Complex and In-Complex conditions, where subjects face four options in
each game. These conditions give the opportunity to test the robustness of group identity
to a change in the context of decisions that should in principle be irrelevant for a rational
decision-maker.
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The results across our experimental conditions can shed interesting light on the nature
of the group identity effect. According to the social preferences account, complexity should
not alter the effect of group identity. According to the framing account, instead, in a new
context the group identity effect may be partially or totally displaced by an alternative rule
of thumb. As we shall see, our data lend support to the latter hypothesis, against the social
preference interpretation of group identity.
3. Experimental design and procedures
The full list of games used in our experiment can be found in Table 1. The order of the
binary choices, as well as the labels of the options (A or B) are assigned randomly. One unit
is worth one cent of a euro, so for example, 1,000 units = 10 euro. The games can be classified
into five types, called “zero-sum giving”, “expensive giving”, “cheap giving”, “envy”, and
“spite” games.
Figure 1 provides an intuitive representation, on the plan of self/other payoff profiles,
of the kind of options offered. For the sake of simplicity we have only included some rep-
resentative games rather than all forty-four games. A solid line represents a mini-dictator
game with the two options at each end of the line. The forty-five degrees dotted line traces
all perfectly egalitarian allocations. Inequalities in the payoffs are favourable to the dictator
above that line; below the dotted line, they are favourable to the recipient. A horizontal
solid line means that the payoff of the recipient can be increased or decreased at no cost for
the dictator (in this case, not giving may be interpreted as envy). A positive slope means
that giving is beneficial both to the recipient and to the dictator (not giving may be evidence
of spite).5 If the line is negatively inclined, the dictator faces a trade-off between her own
payoff and that of the dictator. The slope of the constraint represents the relative price of
giving: if the cost is equal to one (every cent to the recipient costs one cent to the dictator) the
slope is orthogonal to the equality line and the game is Zero-sum. A steeper line represents
Expensive Giving, while a flatter line stands for Cheap Giving games. In general, moving
5Notice that in Spite games the slope is less than one (more precisely, 0.5), which means that the dictator can
reduce the payoff of the recipient of a given amount by reducing his earnings of an amount equal to half of that
amount. We gathered evidence in a pilot experiment that the spiteful option is never chosen when the price is
1 : 1.
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Option A Option B
Round pid pir pid pir Type
1 800 1200 800 1000 Envy
2 1200 800 1400 400 Cheap Giving
3 1100 500 1100 900 Envy
4 1000 600 1000 1000 Envy
5 800 1200 1200 1000 Expensive Giving
6 900 1100 700 1300 Zero-Sum Giving
7 1600 400 1200 800 Zero-Sum Giving
8 1200 800 1200 600 Envy
9 800 1200 600 1600 Cheap Giving
10 800 1200 1000 800 Cheap Giving
11 1500 500 1100 900 Zero-Sum Giving
12 1400 600 1000 1000 Zero-Sum Giving
13 1200 400 1200 800 Envy
14 1200 800 1200 1000 Envy
15 900 1100 1300 900 Expensive Giving
16 900 1100 900 700 Envy
17 800 1200 600 1400 Zero-Sum Giving
18 900 1100 1300 700 Zero-Sum Giving
19 1100 900 1300 700 Zero-Sum Giving
20 1100 900 1500 700 Expensive Giving
21 1600 600 1200 800 Expensive Giving
22 800 1400 1000 1000 Cheap Giving
23 1000 1000 1400 800 Expensive Giving
24 1000 1000 1200 1400 Spite
25 1000 1200 1000 1000 Envy
26 1200 800 1400 1200 Spite
27 800 1200 800 1600 Envy
28 700 1300 1100 900 Zero-Sum Giving
29 800 1200 800 1400 Envy
30 1200 800 1000 1000 Zero-Sum Giving
31 800 1200 400 1600 Zero-Sum Giving
32 1100 1300 1100 900 Envy
33 1200 600 1000 1000 Cheap Giving
34 1000 1000 800 600 Spite
35 1100 900 1300 500 Cheap Giving
36 900 1100 500 1500 Zero-Sum Giving
37 1100 1500 900 1100 Spite
38 1000 1400 1000 1000 Envy
39 1400 600 1200 800 Zero-Sum Giving
40 1200 800 1000 1200 Cheap Giving
41 700 1500 900 1200 Cheap Giving
42 900 1100 900 1500 Envy
43 900 1100 1100 700 Cheap Giving
44 1000 800 1000 1000 Envy
pid stands for dictator’s payoff, pir for recipient’s payoff.
Table 1: Our set of mini-dictator games
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upward and to the right increases social welfare, intended as the joint payoff of dictator and
recipient.
Figure 1: Mini-dictator games in the space of self-other payoffs
The experiment described in this paper is close in spirit to a study recently performed
by Chen and Li (2009), who report the results of twenty-four games in which group identity
is manipulated. Of these, however, only five are mini-dictator games with two available op-
tions. As we shall see shortly, this leaves a large amount of space unexplored and gives rise
to rather idiosyncratic estimates of social preference functions. Because we systematically
vary the cost of giving, our experiment is also partly similar to the study of Bhatia (2013)
mentioned above. Unlike Bhatia (2013), however, we use mini-dictator games, explore the
space of envious and spiteful options, and try to detect the existence of non-well-behaved
preference structures (e.g. lexicographic orderings) that cannot be identified using “modi-
fied” dictator games a la Andreoni and Miller (2002).
A comparative advantage of our experimental design is that it offers a broader picture
of attitudes to distributive choice. The subjects of Chen and Li’s experiment for example
never face expensive giving, spite, or equality-enhancing envy games (see Figure 2). Such
choices, in contrast, are included among the forty-four games of our study. As explained in
the next section, such a framework (i) provides an exhaustive map of choices over self-other
allocations; (ii) reveals how these choices are affected by group identity in different areas of
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the plane; and (iii) tests the robustness of the group identity effect to small variations in the
complexity of the task.
Figure 2: Mini-dictator games of Chen and Li (2009) in the space of self-other payoffs
The design used by Bhatia (2013), in contrast, allows the estimation of preferences when
there is a trade-off between self-other allocations, but is unfit to measure the effect of identity
in Envy and Spite games. (See Figure 3; for simplicity we have represented on the Cartesian
plane only a representative subset of the budget constraints used in this experiment.). Its
“modified” dictator games, moreover, cannot guarantee that choices in certain areas of the
Cartesian plane are ever observed in the experimental sessions.
Figure 3: “Modified” dictator games of Bhatia (2013) as budget constraints in the space of self-other payoffs
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3.1. Design
Since our experiment is mainly concerned with the effect of identity within groups, we
implement only ingroup matchings, and we compare the results with a control condition
where subjects have not been assigned to groups. More precisely, the experiment consists of
four conditions or treatments in a pure between-subject design: a Baseline condition with-
out group identity; an Ingroup condition with group identity; a Complex condition with a
larger set of options; and an In-Complex condition with group identity and a larger set of
options. In the Baseline and Ingroup conditions the dictators were asked to choose among
two possible allocations. In the Complex and In-Complex conditions in contrast subjects
faced four options in each game. Two of these options were identical to those that we of-
fered in the Baseline and Ingroup conditions, and strictly dominated the additional options
(in Pareto’s sense). The additional options were generated simply by subtracting 200 units
from the payoffs of dictator and recipient. For example, when in the other treatments sub-
jects were asked to choose among (1000, 1000) and (800, 1100), in the two complex conditions
they were asked to choose among (1000, 1000), (800, 800), (800, 1100) and (600, 900). Notice
that in all forty-four choices the second and fourth options are always dominated by the first
and third options. In Figure 1 the dominated options could be represented by a parallel solid
line located below and to the left of the original choice. Dominated options should never be
chosen by rational agents given that they represent the same type of choice as offered by the
first and third options. We also doubt that dominated options may be chosen deliberately
out of spite, because evidence from a pilot experiment showed that such a choice is never
made when subjects are offered binary options with a price of non-giving equal to one.
3.2. Procedures
The experiment was articulated in two phases: in the first stage, subjects had to perform
a simple memory task; in the second stage they faced the forty-four mini-dictator games
described above, in one of the four conditions. The memory task was conducted either
individually (Baseline and Complex conditions) or collectively to induce group identity (In-
group and In-Complex conditions).
In the Baseline and Complex sessions subjects entered the laboratory and were randomly
assigned to their computer terminals, separated by partitions. The experimenter read the in-
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structions for the first stage, illustrating the memory task. Each subject received the text of
a poem that he/she could study for two minutes. The goal was to memorize and report
correctly one verse of the poem. After two minutes the text was withdrawn and the subjects
were instructed to write down a verse on a blank sheet of paper provided by the experi-
menter. Those who reported the line correctly were rewarded with a prize of three euro.
In the Ingroup and In-Complex sessions subjects entered the laboratory and randomly
picked a coloured number (Blue or Red) that determined their group affiliation. The mem-
bers of each group then gathered in separate areas of the laboratory and received the in-
structions for the first stage of the experiment. The task again was to memorize a poem
and to report it correctly on a sheet of paper provided by the experimenter. The number
of lines to be memorized was equal to the number of subjects in the group (sixteen). The
groups that completed the task successfully received a prize of 48 euro. While the individual
payoffs were identical to those of the Baseline and Complex conditions, the task was meant
on the one hand to foster coordination to achieve a common goal, and on the other hand
to implement the “common fate” condition that is generally considered to be an important
determinant of group identity (e.g. Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Zizzo, 2011). Although our
techniques are not exactly identical, we make use like Chen and Li (2009) of categorization,
communication, and cooperation to induce group identity. These manipulations may be
considered stronger versions of Tajfel’s famous “minimal group” experiments of the 1970s
(Tajfel et al., 1971).
This phase of the experiment lasted approximately fifteen minutes, and the tasks were
so simple that every individual and every group performed them successfully. At this point
it was announced that the second stage was about to begin. In the Ingroup and In-Complex
conditions the gatherings of the Blue and Red groups were dismantled and each subject
was invited to seat at a computer terminal associated with her own number. In the Base-
line and Complex conditions the subjects remained seated at their desks. The experimenter
announced that all subjects/groups had completed successfully the first task and read a
second set of instructions illustrating the mini-dictator games.
We decided not to use the strategy method for the allocation of roles in the mini-dictator
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games.6 The subjects who had picked an odd number were immediately assigned the role of
dictators, and the subjects with an even number were assigned the role of recipients. After
reading the instructions, the experimenter elicited questions from the audience. Once all
doubts had been dispelled, the second stage of the experiment began. The dictators played
the games via their computer terminals, while the recipients waited quietly at their desks. In
the Baseline and Complex conditions, subjects were not associated with any group or colour.
In the Ingroup and In-Complex conditions, dictators were revealed the group identity of
their partners at the beginning of the game, when they saw two coloured icons (Red or
Blue) associated with their own payoff and the payoff of the recipient. Since we ran only
ingroup treatments, dictators were randomly matched with recipients of the same colour.
Subjects received no information about other dictator/recipient matchings.
After the dictators had completed their forty-four decisions, they answered a short ques-
tionnaire concerning demographics, gender, programme of studies, plus a non-incentivised
question about the motivations underlying their choices. The experimenter then asked one
subject to randomly draw a number corresponding to a round of the experiment. The op-
tions for that round were announced publicly so that everybody knew what they would
have earned if the dictator had chosen differently. The dictators were called to the experi-
menter’s desk and paid privately the sum they had allocated to themselves in that round,
plus the sum they had earned in the first stage of the experiment. They were then matched
randomly with a recipient, and saw the experimenter put the recipient’s payoff in an enve-
lope assigned to the drawn number, together with the sum earned in the first stage. After all
the dictators had been paid, the envelopes were distributed anonymously to the recipients,
6The strategy method allows the collection of a large amount of data, because every subject is asked to make
a decision as if she was playing as dictator. The subjects are told who is dictator and who is recipient only later,
and the money is allocated accordingly. This procedure (also called “role uncertainty”) is cost-effective but has
the side effect of inducing the subjects to fantasise about what they would like to happen if they were playing
in a different role than the one they will effectively be assigned. In our case, dictators are likely to speculate
about “what would happen if” or “how I would feel if I was to be assigned the role of recipient later in the
experiment”. Telling a subject right from the start that she is going to be the decision-maker, in contrast, is
less likely to induce empathic feelings in dictators that may interact with the group identity effect. Iriberri and
Rey-Biel (2011) find that the strategy method reduces selfish choice and increases dictators’ concern for social
welfare compared to a control condition with role certainty. The strategy method lowers significantly (by half)
the transfer of resources in trust games (Casari and Cason, 2009). Notice that in many ways role uncertainty
is similar to the “veil of ignorance” device that philosophers use to identify fair allocations or principles of
distributive justice (e.g. Harsanyi, 1976; Rawls, 1971).
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and all the subjects were invited to leave the room. The whole procedure was described
in detail in the instructions and was common knowledge among subjects before they were
asked to make their decisions.
The experiment was implemented with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted approxi-
mately 70 minutes. We ran nine sessions in three separate occasions (January 2012, February
2013, and October 2014). The 256 subjects were inexperienced volunteers from the student
population of the University of Parma, predominantly undergraduates in the Department
of Economics. Among the dictators, male subjects constituted 56.45 per cent of the sam-
ple. The average earning for the whole experiment (first and second stage) was 13.37 euro
(14.8 euro for the dictators, 11.94 euro for the recipients). From now on we shall ignore the
money earned in the first stage (memory task) and concentrate on the allocations chosen in
the mini-dictator games.
4. Results
In this section we present the findings of our experiment. Section 4.1 compares our
results with those obtained in the literature using social preference models. Both our exper-
iment and Chen and Li (2009) show that the effect of group identity on social preferences
is rather weak. In Section 4.2 we disaggregate our data and analyse the impact of group
identity across types of games and treatments. We use several different statistical tools,
and we conclude that the evidence supports the interpretation of group identity in terms of
heuristic.
4.1. Group identity as social preference: a reappraisal
In the study that is closest to our experiment, Chen and Li (2009) measure the effect
of group identity using a simple social preference model devised by Charness and Rabin
(2002). In this sub-section we spend some time analysing Chen and Li’s seminal results,
to illustrate the difficulties of estimating the net effect of group identity on social prefer-
ences. This, in turn, will help us show in which way our study constitutes an improvement
with respect to previous experiments, and how it helps understand the group identity effect
better.
Charness and Rabin (2002) estimate the following utility function for the dictator
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ud(pir;pid) = wpir + (1− w)pid (4)
where the parameter w measures the weight of pro-social motives, i.e. the concern of
dictators for the payoff of the recipient (pir). Notice that this utility function is based on the
strong assumption that pid and pir are perfect substitutes. Charness and Rabin (2002) and
Chen and Li (2009) allow the parameter w to vary depending on whether the payoff of the
dictator is higher or lower than the payoff of the recipient. In practice, the utility function is
specified as follows:
ud(pir;pid) = (ρr + σs)pir + [1− (ρr + σs)]pid (5)
where ρ is a “charity” coefficient that applies when the payoff of the dictator is higher
than that of the recipient (r = 1, s = 0), while σ is an “envy” coefficient that applies when
the payoff of the dictator is lower than that of the recipient (r = 0, s = 1).7 Although
this specification allows the choices to be game-specific to some extent, it also implies that
preferences are stable across different types of games. As we shall see, there are good rea-
sons to doubt that this assumption holds. For example the games in Table 2 are treated as
observationally equivalent by this estimation procedure, in spite of the fact that different
motivations are likely to be at work in each case (pir = pid in Option A, while pir > pid in
Option B, so rA = 0, sA = 0, rB = 1, sB = 0 in all five cases).
Option A Option B
pid pir pid pir Our classification
1000 1000 1400 800 Expensive Giving
1000 1000 1200 800 Zero-Sum Giving
1000 1000 1200 600 Cheap Giving
1000 1000 800 600 Spite
1000 1000 1000 800 Envy
Table 2: Five mini-dictator games
7Note that our definition of envy differs from that in Charness and Rabin (2002), as we classify as envy games
those in which the dictator can increase the payoff of the recipient at no cost, but without any restriction on the
relative levels of the payoffs.
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Chen and Li (2009) estimate the following values for the parameters of the Charness-
Rabin model:
ud(pir;pid) = 0.427pir + 0.573pid, when pir > pid (6)
ud(pir;pid) = −0.049pir + 1.049pid, when pir < pid (7)
Group identity is modelled by means of two dummies, a and b, that capture the addi-
tional impact of the Ingroup manipulation on the charity and envy parameters, respectively:
ud(pir;pid) = [(1+ a)ρr + (1+ b)σs]pir + {1− [(1+ a)ρr + (1+ b)σs]}pid (8)
Chen and Li (2009) estimate this equation with decisions taken in the Ingroup and Out-
group conditions, finding that the weight assigned to the recipient’s payoff in the Ingroup
condition is significantly higher than in the Outgroup condition. (The charity parameters
are 0.474 and 0.323, while the envy parameters are −0.08 and −0.112, respectively.)
Making comparisons across Ingroup and Outgroup conditions magnifies the effect of
group identity, for one is effectively combining an Outgroup with an Ingroup effect. For
this reason it is preferable to measure the net effect of the Ingroup manipulation, taking a
control condition without groups as our reference point. If we use the data in Chen and
Li (2009) to estimate the parameters of the Ingroup choices against the Baseline condition,
unsurprisingly, there is a less pronounced difference across treatments (see Table 3). Notice
that in this case only the identity parameter a is significantly different from zero (at 10%)
determining a charity parameter in the Ingroup condition (0.482) that is significantly higher
than in the Baseline (0.428). In contrast, the identity parameter b turns out to be not signif-
icantly different from zero, implying that the envy parameters are not distinguishable from
each other in the two treatments.
A second concern is that Chen and Li’s estimates are based on a mixed set of data that
does not contain only the results of mini-dictator games. Among twenty-four games, their
data-set includes nineteen sequential “response” game where one player (analogous to the
“recipient”) has the opportunity to make a preliminary move that affects the final allocation
of payoffs. In these games clearly the second mover cannot be equated to that of a pure
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Baseline Ingroup Identity parameters
Charity: (ρ) Envy: (s) Ch: ρ(1+ a) En: s(1+ b) a b
Chen and Li (2009) 0.428** -0.052** 0.482** -0.024* 0.126* -0.534all data (N=999)
Chen and Li (2009) 0.285* -0.219 0.415** 0.172* 0.456 -1.789minidict. (N=196)
Our data 0.230** -0.074** 0.254** -0.086 0.105 0.167(N=2816)
Significance thresholds: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01
Table 3: Estimates of the Charness-Rabin model with different samples
dictator, because decisions are likely to be influenced by reciprocity concerns. Therefore, in
order to get an estimate of subjects’ attitudes toward “pure” distributive choice, we have
estimated the social preference model again on Chen and Li’s data, but using only their
five bona fide mini-dictator games. The absence of reciprocity reduces the weight of the
recipient’s payoff in the Baseline treatment (see the second row of Table 3). The number
of observations however is reduced drastically (about 20% of the original sample), which
certainly contributes to make the identity parameters statistically indistinguishable.
The last row of Table 3 replicates the same exercise using the full set of forty-four mini-
dictator games in our Ingroup and Baseline conditions. Notice that the charity parameter
in our Baseline condition is lower than Chen and Li’s (all data) while it is of the same order
of magnitude as the parameter estimated using their subsample of minidictators. The envy
parameter is instead closer to the full set of games in Chen and Li (2009). The weights of
the recipient’s payoff look stable across our experimental treatments. In fact, the identity
parameters are rather low and not significantly different from zero. This result suggests
either that the impact of group identity on distributive preferences is modest, or that the
effect of group identity is not captured by this estimation procedure.
The point of this analysis is not to question the general picture emerging from Chen
and Li’s measures of the impact of group identity on social preferences, but to illustrate
how difficult it is to obtain a meaningful estimate by mixing the data of a small number of
experimental games. Overall, we suspect that aggregate data provide limited information
regarding the motives that drive dictators’ behaviour. To achieve better insights it is nec-
essary to look separately at classes of games that offer similar trade-offs among egalitarian,
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altruistic, selfish, and efficient options. In the next section we proceed gradually, moving
from relatively broad to more refined classifications.
4.2. Group identity as heuristic
In this sub-section we analyze data across treatments and types of games. The results
lend support to the interpretation of group identity as the trigger of a particular heuristic
rather than as a manipulation of social preferences. Section 4.2.1 presents simple summary
statistics and non-parametric tests. In Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 we use multivariate analysis
to look at the main determinants of behaviour across treatments and types of game, respec-
tively.
4.2.1. Summary statistics
Table 4 reports choice frequencies and non-parametric tests across treatments for five
different types of mini-dictator games. We have 32 independent observations and roughly
1400 decisions for each treatment. In the Complex conditions the overwhelming majority
of decisions (95%) converged on one of the two options shared in common with the other
treatments, so we eliminate the dominated choices from our analysis. 8
Starting from the top row, the games are listed in order of decreasing cost of altruism. In
the class of so-called “giving” games the payoff of the recipient can only be increased at a
cost for the dictator. In Expensive, Zero-Sum, and Cheap Giving games, each donated unit
costs respectively two units, one unit, and half a unit to the dictator. In Envy games the
payoff of the dictator is invariant across the options (giving is costless and not giving thus
may be motivated by envy). In Spite games, finally, altruism is advantageous and not giving
is costly for the dictator. Across all conditions the data suggest that choices are influenced
not only by the cost of giving, but also by the relative rank of dictator and recipient’s payoffs:
when the dictator’s payoff is larger regardless of her choice, we shall say that the game is
“favourable” to the dictator. When giving implies a larger payoff for the recipient, we shall
say that altruism is “unfavourable” to the dictator.
8Four subjects were responsible for more than half (58.6%) of the dominated choices, suggesting a high
degree of confusion. Without these four subjects, dominated options account for only 2.2% of the choices.
Replicating the analysis without these “confused” subjects does not affect the results in any significant way.
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Significance is calculated with a battery of Fisher exact tests. The tests evaluate whether
the fraction of subjects making an altruistic choice in each type of game differs significantly
from what is observed in another condition. Table 4 contains four pairwise comparison:
Baseline Vs. Ingroup, Complex Vs. In-Complex, Baseline Vs. Complex, and Ingroup Vs. In-
Complex. For instance, the fraction of subjects making an altruistic choice in the Expensive
Giving Favourable games is significantly higher in the Ingroup compared both to the Base-
line and to the In-Complex conditions, while this is not the case comparing the Complex
with the In-Complex and the Baseline treatments.




Fav 3 12.50 ←−∗∗−→ 23.96 19.32 13.04
←−−−−−−−−∗∗−−−−−−−−→
Unfav 2 10.94 12.50 11.86 9.52
Zero-sum Giving
∆pid = −200 or −400;
∆pir = +200 or +400;
←−−−−−−−−∗−−−−−−−−→
Fav 6 21.35 21.88 28.96 ←−∗∗−→ 18.78
←−−−−−−−−∗−−−−−−−−→




Fav 3 26.04 25.00 34.44 28.89
←−−−−−−−∗ ∗ ∗−−−−−−−→




∆pir = +200 or +400;
←−−−−−−−∗ ∗ ∗−−−−−−−→
Fav 6 73.44 68.23 84.92 81.87
←−−−−−−−∗ ∗ ∗−−−−−−−→
←−−−−−−−∗ ∗ ∗−−−−−−−→






4 84.38 83.59 91.53 92.06
←−−−−−−−−∗∗−−−−−−−−→
The figures represent the frequency with which the most favourable option for the recipient is chosen.
∆pid and ∆pir represent the change in the payoffs of dictator and recipient.
Significance thresholds obtained with a battery of Fisher tests: *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01.
Table 4: Summary of results per class of games, and according to treatment.
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We begin with Giving games, which have already been the subject of analysis in previous
experiments, most of which report an increase of donations in the Ingroup compared to the
Baseline condition. Such a result holds in our giving games, although the difference reaches
statistical significance only in some sub-classes of games. Note further that if altruism re-
sults in an unfavourable allocation, dictators are much less likely to give to the recipient.
As soon as we extend the analysis to Envy and Spite games, however, the effect of group
identity changes drastically. In Envy games the group identity manipulation increases the
probability that the dictator withdraws money from the recipient, even though choosing the
altruistic option would not reduce the payoff of the dictator. Moreover, the effect holds both
when the difference in payoffs is favourable to the dictator, and when it is unfavourable.
In so-called Spite games, choosing the altruistic option is advantageous to the dictator, so
unsurprisingly this allocation is chosen by a large majority of subjects. The effect of group
identity is insignificant.
These data confirm that it is important to use a wide range of mini-dictator games. Al-
though it is possible to estimate consistent and robust social preference functions by restrict-
ing the analysis to a homogeneous class of games, the parameter specifications are fragile
when we move across different classes.
The second result that emerges from Table 4 is the effect of complexity. Recall that sub-
jects in this condition are offered a choice between four options, two of which are dominated
and hence in principle irrelevant for a rational decision maker. The analysis of reaction times
unsurprisingly indicates that subjects spend more time to make each decision in the Com-
plex and In-Complex condition than in the Baseline and In-group conditions.9 However,
complexity also increases generosity in most of the classes, as shown by the comparison
between the Complex and the Baseline conditions, particularly when it is associated with
a gain in terms of efficiency. Although we lack data that could support this hypothesis di-
rectly, the psychological literature on the attraction effect (Simonson, 1989) suggests that
subjects may follow a heuristic based on the systematic search of Pareto-improvements (or
9Reaction times increase roughly from seven to eleven seconds in the two complex treatments. Interestingly,
subjects take significantly more time to make altruistic choices, compared to selfish ones. Group identity reduces
the time of altruistic choice only in Giving games (where it increases generosity), which suggests that it does
indeed function as a “fast and frugal” heuristic. Data about reaction times are available upon request.
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the elimination of dominated options). The elimination of dominated options, once trig-
gered, may induce dictators to discard systematically all inefficient allocations, and hence
the attraction effect seems to be strengthened in the complex conditions.
A similar effect is observed in Spite games. In these games dictators have the opportu-
nity to lower the payoff of the recipient at a cost for themselves. The frequency of spiteful
choices is low but still noteworthy (around 16%) in the Baseline and in the Ingroup condi-
tions. Complexity however leads to a significant reduction of spiteful behaviour. Again, this
is unsurprising if the dictators follow the strategy of eliminating dominated options: spite is
always inefficient and it is systematically avoided by dictators who adopt this decision rule.
Crucially, our data show that complexity destroys the effect of group identity that has
been observed in the Ingroup treatment. The mere presence of a pair of dominated alloca-
tions is sufficient to reverse the effect of group membership. Both the increased pro-sociality
in the Giving games and the envy-inducing effect of group identity are swept away. Choices
in In-Complex become indistinguishable from those in the Complex treatment across the
board, with two puzzling exceptions within Giving games in which the fraction of altruistic
choices is significantly lower than in the Complex and more in line with the Baseline condi-
tion. This finding suggests that subjects follow a completely different decision heuristic.
4.2.2. Multivariate analysis
To back up these insights, we run some regressions on the entire sample of data (N=5492,
i.e. 44 choices of 128 dictators, disregarding 140 dominated choices). The multivariate spec-
ification that can be implemented is limited for two reasons. The first is the linear depen-
dence of determinants. For instance, it is impossible to disentangle at the same time the
role played by variations in the dictator’s payoff (self-interest) from the role of variations in
the recipient’s payoff (altruism) and from the level of efficiency, because one measure is by
construction a linear combination of the other two. As a result, we are forced to choose a
parsimonious specification in which the degrees of freedom for each choices are limited to:
1. Variations in dictator’s payoff (Self), defined as the difference between the dictator’s
payoff in Option A minus his payoff in Option B;
2. Variations in recipient’s payoff (Alt), defined as the difference between the recipient’s
payoff in Option A minus his payoff in Option B;
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3. Inequality in one of the two options (Diff), defined as the difference between the dic-
tator’s and the recipient’s payoff in (the arbitrarily chosen) Option A.
Subjects’ choices may of course differ according to how these factors are combined (i.e.
the type of game), according to the characteristics of the treatment, and as a function of indi-
vidual characteristics. In other words, the payoff features (1-3) can in principle be interacted
with other variables to enrich the empirical specification.
Apart from obvious dimensionality problems induced by the introduction of a complete
set of interactions, such an exercise is also limited by the experimental design. Our list of
forty-four choices covers five types of game, different signs and degrees of inequality, as
well as different levels of payoffs. Although wide, the set of choices does not ensure enough
variance to disentangle all the possible interactions between the determinants. For instance,
it is not possible to interact the effect of Self with that of the type of game, because the two
are highly correlated. Only within the Zero-Sum Giving games there is some variance in the
change of dictator’s payoffs; the difference in dictator’s payoffs is always 400 units in Ex-
pensive Giving games, 200 units in Cheap Giving and in Spite games, and zero units in Envy
games. Hence, we cannot disentangle whether the likelihood of making a selfish choice de-
pends on the type of game rather than on the size of Self, because a higher variance in the
change of dictator’s payoffs within each type of game would be required to accomplish this
task.10
To ensure a meaningful interpretation of the coefficients we use as dependent variable
the probability of choosing the left option in each choice (see Table 1 for a summary of
choices).11
To exploit the longitudinal nature of the data we estimate a fixed effect model controlling
for any observable and unobservable individual characteristic. We fully exploit the degrees
of freedom that are available, including among the explanatory variables the variation in
10Besides limiting our empirical specification, notice that this feature also imposes a constraint on the number
of parameters that can be meaningfully included in the model. This problem is present a fortiori in earlier
experiments that try to estimate social preference functions using fewer games with less variance in payoffs
than ours.
11Had we chosen instead the probability of making the choice that maximizes the dictator’s payoff, most of
the effect of the Self coefficient would have been captured by the constant. A similar argument would apply
to the Alt coefficient in case we had chosen as dependent variable the probability of making the choice that
maximizes the recipient’s payoff.
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the payoff of the dictator (Self) and of the recipient (Alt), as well as the difference between
self/other payoffs in the left option (Diff). To increase psychological realism, we allow for
a different reaction between positive and negative differences in the level of payoffs (Posdiff
when pid > pir Vs. Negdiff when pid < pir ), as well as for perfectly equal payoffs (NodiffA,
NodiffB).12 We then estimate a linear probability model, so that coefficients can straightfor-
wardly be read as percentage changes (0.01 = 1%).
Column 1 of Table 5 shows what happens when these variables are regressed on our
entire data-set. Notice that the probability of choosing a given option increases with the
change in payoffs of both players, although unsurprisingly the effect is stronger for one’s
own payoffs. The coefficient of 0.00149 for Self means that the likelihood of choosing Option
A increases by 14.9% for every euro of difference in pir between Option A and Option B.
Second, dictators react negatively as the difference in the payoffs increases, regardless of its
sign. The dummy variable NodiffB substantially increases the likelihood that Option B is
preferred.
As a second step, we allow some of these explanatory variables to have a different impact
across treatments, by means of interaction terms with our Baseline, Ingroup, Complex, and
In-Complex conditions. Since the interaction terms with the difference in the level of the
payoffs (Posdiff and Negdiff ) turn out to be systematically non-significant, we have removed
them from the estimated models.
The regressions reveal that the effect of self-interest is different across treatments. It is
significantly lower in the Ingroup conditions, with group identity that seems to reduce self-
ish concerns, consistently with common wisdom. However, adding the dominated options
more than counterbalances this effect: in fact, the sum of the coefficients of the interaction
terms (In, Complex, and In-Complex) is significantly positive (F-test, p = 0.052). The ef-
fect of altruism is also idiosyncratic, although unsurprisingly its size is much smaller across
the board. What is truly surprising is that group identity alone seems to reduce altruistic
concerns. Again, the sum of the coefficients of the interaction terms (In, Complex, and In-
Complex) is significantly positive (F-test, p < 0.001). The impact of the difference in the
12Notice that these coefficients cannot be interpreted in terms of inequality aversion because we do not take
into account the difference in the payoffs of the alternative option.
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level of payoffs barely changes, compared to the first regression.13 Overall, these results
confirm the findings reported in the previous section, i.e. that the effects of group identity
are not robust, since a small perturbation of the task is sufficient to make them disappear.
However, in order to better understand how complexity affects group identity it is necessary
to distinguish between different types of games.
Dependent Variable: Choice of left option
(1) (2)
















Posdiff -0.00031 *** -0.00031 ***
[12.57] [12.52]




NodiffB -.08836 *** -0.08831 ***
[6.14] [6.18]
N 5492 5492
Adj. R2 0.351 0.360
Linear probability model including individual fixed effects.
Absolute t-statistics in brackets. Significance thresholds : *=0.1, **=0.05, ***=0.01
Table 5: Fixed-effects estimates (whole sample)
13Results are robust to Probit and Logit specifications, with the only small exception of the coefficient of
NodiffA that becomes significant in the Logit model.
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4.2.3. Multivariate analysis by type of game
In this section we appraise the robustness of the group identity effect across different types
of games. The constraints imposed by design become even more binding at this point, be-
cause the variance of the regressors across different classes of games cannot be exploited
any longer. As a consequence, the estimations that follow do not include the same variables
as in Table 5. For instance, in Giving games there is a strong negative correlation between
the payoffs of the two players. Hence, it would not be meaningful to include both Self and
Alt variables in the regression. For this reason we include in the regression of Table 6 only
the opportunity cost of giving that is implicit in each choice (Oppcost=Self/Alt). Notice that
the opportunity cost of the altruistic choice distinguishes Cheap from Zero-sum and from
Expensive games, as the absolute value of Oppcost is lower than, equal to, and greater than
one, respectively.
The effect of the opportunity cost of making an altruistic choice in Giving games is in line
with ex ante expectations, as shown in the first column of Table 6. A 100% increase of the
price of giving implies a 33% decrease in the probability of giving. Group identity makes the
altruistic choice significantly more likely, ceteris paribus, and so does adding the dominated
choices to the Baseline. In contrast, these effects vanish completely when complexity and
group identity interact. The sum of the coefficients of the interaction terms (In, Complex,
and In-Complex) is not significantly different from zero (F-test, p = 0.802). Differences in the
level of dictator’s and recipient’s payoffs still play a significant role (unfavorable differences
even more so), and the absence of inequality turns out to be particularly relevant.
The second column of Table 6 provides a useful comparison with those games in which
the payoff of the dictator does not change across the available options, i.e. so-called Envy
games. In this case the variable self has obviously been omitted as it is constant and equal to
zero, and therefore the probability of making an altruistic choice only depends on the pay-
off of the recipient and on the difference between the payoffs. Altruism exerts a significant
effect, while the role played by differences in the payoffs is less clear-cut. The correlation
in the Ingroup condition is significantly negative. This means that in the Ingroup condition
subjects are less likely to benefit their counterpart for free than in the Baseline, i.e. the op-
posite effect than the one we would have expected. Adding the two dominated options has
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Dependent Variable: Choice of left option

















Posdiff -0.00027 *** -0.00013 *
[9.77] [1.65]




NodiffB -0.07807 *** -0.09316 ***
[4.11] [3.63]
N 3240 1752
Adj. R2 0.430 0.168
Absolute t-statistics in brackets. The variable nodiffleft is not included in Column 2 because (by chance) there is
no envy game without difference in the payoffs in the left option. Significance thresholds : *=0.1, **=0.05,
***=0.01
Table 6: Fixed-effects estimates (by type of game)
both the effect of increasing efficiency, and that of reversing the envious behaviour observed
in the Ingroup treatment.
As far as Spite games are concerned, it is not possible to estimate a model delivering
more insights than the one in Table 4, due both to the linear combination between the change
of payoffs of dictators and recipients, and to the relatively low number of games of this
type. Once we control for (Posdiff and Negdiff the only coefficient approaching traditional
significance levels is that of Complex confirming the use of an efficiency-enhancing decision
rule. In this case no role is played by group identity.
The findings seem to indicate that the effect of group identity cannot be accounted for
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in terms of a (regular) shift in social preference parameters. First, the Ingroup manipula-
tion induces a change in behaviour that varies considerably across different types of games.
Second, this effect is not robust to an increase of complexity caused by the addition of two
dominated options.
5. Conclusion
The experiment was designed to achieve two goals: first, we aimed to extend the range
of mini-dictator games used in the literature, so as to map the effect of group identity in a
broader space of self-other allocations. Second and foremost, we intended to test the robust-
ness of social preference models and to explore an alternative account of group identity as a
framing effect (Bacharach, 2006; Tajfel, 1982).
On the first front, we have seen that the effect of group identity on distributive choice
is modest overall and highly variable across types of games. Charness and Rabin’s model
of social preference, used by Chen and Li (2009), is unable to capture the impact of group
identity on the whole set of games, a null result that we explain as a composition effect.
This failure confirms our ex ante conjecture that it is important to extend the experimental
design to cover choices that do not imply a strictly positive trade-off between dictator’s and
recipient’s payoff. Moreover, the results cast a shadow of doubt on the robustness of the
effect of group identity across different games.
A further insight is derived by introducing a minor change in the environment that, in
principle, should not affect the behaviour of dictators. In the complex conditions subjects
are exposed to the same group identity manipulation, exactly as in the Ingroup vs. Baseline
treatments, but dictators are asked to choose among a larger set of options that includes
two additional dominated allocations. We observe that this manipulation of complexity
increases efficiency across the board, compared to the simple Baseline condition. This result
shows that social preferences in general are not perfectly stable, something that is already
known from different studies (Bardsley, 2008; List, 2007). However, when complexity is
combined with identity, the change of behavior is of a different nature, since we observe
a complete reversal of the ingroup effect. Surprisingly, in a complex environment group
identity either has no impact, or has the opposite effect than what we observe in the simple
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task, thereby violating minimal regularity requirements.
These data suggest that group identity, when it is induced in the laboratory, is fragile
to minor variations in the choice menu. Since preferences and utility functions, as they
are usually understood in economics, are supposed to capture regular patterns, our data
indicate that the effect of group identity should not be included in agents’ utility functions
(contrary to what is suggested by Akerlof and Kranton (2010) and others). In our view
the data also lend plausibility to a specific hypothesis that deserves more attention than it
has received so far: group identity manipulations do not change individual preferences,
replacing selfish motives with a concern for the common good. Rather, they trigger a set
of heuristic rules that induce different behaviours (generous and/or inequality reducing)
across different types of games.
Like other heuristics that have been studied in the psychological and economic litera-
ture, group identity provides guidance in an unfamiliar experimental situation and allows
subjects to economize cognitive effort. However, it competes for cognitive salience with al-
ternative rules of thumb and hence may be easily displaced by small changes in the decision
environment. Our complex conditions were designed to explore this scenario. The addition
of dominated options either erased the effect of group identity or induced diametrically op-
posite behaviour. It is possible – perhaps likely – that the mere presence of dominated op-
tions made an alternative decision heuristic salient, as shown by psychological studies of the
so-called “attraction effect” (Huber and Puto (1982), Simonson (1989)). When this heuristic
(elimination of dominated choices) was adopted by the dictators, the effect of group identity
disappeared or changed direction altogether.
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6. Appendix: Experimental instructions
[The main text is a literal translation of the original instructions (in Italian) for the Baseline
condition; whenever the instructions differed in the Ingroup or in the complex conditions, we have
inserted the relevant paragraphs between brackets.]
6.1. Stage 1
You are about to take part in an experiment financed for research purposes by various
foundations. The experiment is divided in two phases. At the beginning of each stage you
will receive instructions that will explain the task you will face. Throughout the experiment
it will be prohibited to speak or help other participants. If you have any doubt or ques-
tion please ask the assistants. If you do not follow this rule, we will exclude you from the
experiment and from any payment.
In the first phase of the experiment you will have to perform an individual task. You will
have to memorize at least one verse of a poem, and report it correctly on a sheet of paper that
will be provided by the assistants. You can keep the text of the poem for a minute, during
which you will have to try to memorize the verse. At the end of this period, the assistant
will collect the text of the poem, and give you a blank sheet of paper and a pen, which you
can keep for another minute during which you can write the verse memorized. At the end
of this period the assistant will collect the paper and check the correspondence with the text
of the poem.
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If you report correctly at least one verse, you will get a prize of 3 euro. This sum of
money will be paid at the end of the experiment together with the earnings of Phase 2.
Note that:
• The verse must be reported correctly.
• If it is not reported correctly or not reported at all, you will not earn anything.
• It is possible to write more than one verse, to be safe, but the verses in excess will not
earn you any extra cash. Are there any questions ?
[In the Ingroup and In-Complex conditions the text from the second paragraph was
modified as follows:
At the beginning of the experiment you have been assigned a coloured bracelet. Players
with red bracelets belong to the Red group, while those with the blue bracelet belong to the
Blue group.
In the first phase of the experiment you will have to perform a collective task. The group
will be asked to memorize a number of verses of a poem, and report them correctly on a
sheet of paper that will be provided by the assistant. You can keep the text of the poem for
five minutes, during which you will have to try to memorize the verses. At the end of this
period, the assistant will collect the text, and give you a blank sheet of paper and a marker,
which you can keep for another five minutes, during which you can write the verses you
have memorized. At the end of this period the assistant will collect the paper and check the
correspondence with the text of the poem.
If you report correctly at least 16 verses, the group will earn a prize of 48 euro to be
divided equally among the members (3 euro each). The money will be paid at the end of the
experiment together with the earnings of Phase 2 .
Note that :
• The verses must be reported correctly.
• If the correct verses are 15 or less, the group will fail and will not earn anything.
• It is possible to write more than 16 verses, to be safe, but the verses in excess will not
earn you any extra cash.
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Are there any questions?]
6.2. Stage 2
The second phase of the experiment begins now. The instructions which we have dis-
tributed are only for your personal use. During this phase it is prohibited to communicate
with the other participants. If you have any doubts or questions please ask the assistants. If
you do not follow this rule, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from any
payment.
During the second phase of the experiment the participants who picked an odd number
will have the opportunity to make choices that will affect your earnings. The participants
with an even number instead will wait and will be remunerated according to the decisions
made by the other participants. Overall, the experiment consists of 44 periods of play, and
each period corresponds to a choice. The choices made by each subject will not be disclosed
to other participants. The anonymity will be maintained both during and after the experi-
ment: all the money you will earn will be paid privately at the end of the experiment.
6.2.1. Description of decision
During the experiment, each subject will play with another individual selected at ran-
dom from the other participants [and identified only by a colour (red or blue, depending on the
bracelet he/she is wearing) that identifies the group membership of each experimental subject.]
If you have picked an even number, you will not have to make any decision, but you
will simply wait while the other participants make their decisions. If you have picked an
odd number, you will have to make a series of 44 decisions that will determine your income
and that of another experimental subject with an even number. Every decision is a choice
between two [four] allocations of money, representing a profile of sums assigned by the
decision maker to himself/herself and to another person selected at random among the
participants (called the recipient). The allocation chosen by the decision maker cannot be
challenged by the recipient, who will play therefore an entirely passive role.
For example, during a round of play, a decision maker might be asked to choose between





If the decision maker chooses allocation (1) he/she earns 12 euro, and the recipient earns
8 euro. If the decision maker chooses (2) he/she earns 8 euro, and the recipient earns 12
euro.







If the decision maker chooses allocation (1) he/she earns 12 euro, and the recipient earns
8 euro. If the decision maker chooses (2) he/she earns 6 euro, and the recipient earns 10
euro. If the decision maker chooses (3) he/she earns 8 euro, and the recipient earns 12 euro.
If he/she chooses (4), the decision maker earns 10 euro, and the recipient earns 6 euro.]
During and after the game the identity of the recipient will remain anonymous [and each
player will be identified only by the colour of his/her own group (Red or Blue)]. Your decisions will
be disclosed only to the recipient with whom you will be paired, which however will not be
aware of your identity.
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to fill a short questionnaire. When you have
finished, the assistants will draw randomly one of the 44 periods of play, and announce
publicly the monetary allocations among which the decision-makers faced in that round.
This way, each recipient will know which options were available to the decision-makers at
the time of play.
The decision-makers will be called individually to the assistants desk where they will
receive the amount of cash they have chosen for themselves in that period of the game, plus
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the money they have earned in the first phase of the experiment. Each payment will take
place in private.
The money assigned to the recipient will then be placed into an anonymous envelope
marked by a number [and by a colour (red or blue)] corresponding to that of the recipient. The
assistant will draw randomly one of the even numbers and mark the envelope accordingly.
When all the decision-makers will have been paid, each receiver will be called individually
to the desk, where he/she will receive the envelope marked with his/her number. The
envelope will contain the money awarded by the decision maker, plus the money earned in
the first phase of the experiment, and will be handed to the recipient privately.
You will be asked to sign a receipt, and then you will be allowed to leave the room
quietly. We will be grateful if you will not discuss the experiment with other students after
leaving the laboratory.
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